Michigan Law Review
Volume 50

Issue 6

1952

REGULATION OF BUSINESS--ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT-DEFENSES OF IN PARI DELICTO AND CHANGED MARKET
CONDITIONS
William K. Davenport
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Commercial Law Commons

Recommended Citation
William K. Davenport, REGULATION OF BUSINESS--ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT--DEFENSES OF IN PARI
DELICTO AND CHANGED MARKET CONDITIONS, 50 MICH. L. REV. 948 (1952).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol50/iss6/18

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

948

MICHIGAN

LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 50

REGULATION OF BusIN.Ess-RoBINSON-PATMAN Acr-DEFENSES OF IN PARI
DELICTO AND CHANGED MAmmT CoNDITIONs-A group of businessmen in Santa
Rosa, New Mexico, organized a boycott against all bread except that baked by
plaintiff, the sole baker in Santa Rosa, to induce him not to move his bakery out
of town; plaintiff agreed to this plan. Defendant, who sold in interstate commerce, thereupon halved his bread prices in Santa Rosa while maintaining them
in other towns, in order to defeat the boycott and preserve the town as a market.
Plaintiff brought an action for treble damages under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act:1 for injuries suffered from this price discrimination. The federal

1 " • . . it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers
of commodities of like grade and quality • . . where the effect of such discrimination may
be substantially •.. to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either
of them••••" 49 Stat. L. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §13(a).

1952]

RECENT DECISIONS

949

district court gave judgment for defendant on the ground that plaintiff was in
pari delicto, and was affirmed by the court of appeals. 2 On certiorari, the Supreme
Court remanded3 to the court of appeals for reconsideration in the light of the
Kiefer-Stewart case,4 which had recently held, on different facts, that a plaintiff's "equal fault" under the Sherman Act is not a defense. Held, defendant has
no defenses; remanded for a new trial to ascertain whether there was the requisite
lessening of competition. The Kiefer-Stewart case is controlling to deny the defense of in pari qelicto even where plaintiff's wrong induced defendant's violation.
Furthermore, a boycott participated in by a plaintiff is not a "changed condition
affecting the market" of the kind which may justify a price discrimination.
Moore 11. Mead Service Co.~ (10th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 540. 5
That a plaintiff who is a party to an agreement illegal under the anti-trust
laws is in pari delicto and can have no action arising out of that agreement is
now settled law. 6 The Kiefer-Stewart case, which the court was ordered to
follow in the principal case, makes it clear that a plaintiff's independent violation, on the other hand, is not a defense to a private action under the Sherman
Act. It is perhaps arguable that where a plaintiff's wrong causes defendant's
violation, as in the principal case, the Kiefer-Stewart doctrine should be distinguished and plaintiff should be denied recovery under the concept of in pari
delicto. The present Supreme Court, however, is likely to restrict in pari delicto
as a defense, since it inevitably works to curb the private sanction against price
discriminations and other illegalities under the anti-trust laws. 7 The court in
the principal case also considered a defense which has apparently never been
adjudicated before: the "changed market conditions" proviso of Robinson-Patman
Act, section 2(a).8 Defendant had argued that plaintiff's boycott constituted
such a change in his Santa Rosa market as would justify his cutting prices there,
but the court construed the language of the proviso as permitting price changes
only for specific lots of goods which must be disposed of at reduced prices from
their own nature. 9 This is certainly a reasonable interpretation in view of the
examples given of conditions which will justify a discrimination. It is submitted,

2 Moore v. Mead Service Co., (10th Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d) 338; noted in 51 CoL. L.
REv. 523 (1951).
3 340 U.S. 944, 71 S.Ct. 528 (1951).
4 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 71 S.Ct. 259 (1951).
5 Certiorari was denied, 342 U.S. 902, 72 S.Ct. 290 (1952). The principal case is
also noted in 65 HARv. L. REv. 524 (1952).
6 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Blackmore, (2d Cir. 1921) 277 F. 694; Bluefield S.S. Co.
v. United Fruit Co., (3d Cir. 1917) 243 F. 1. See note and cases cited, 51 CoL. L. REv.
523 (1951).
7 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, supra note 4; Standard Oil Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 340 U.S. 231, 71 S.Ct. 240 (1951).
8 " ••• nothing herein contained shall prevent price changes from time to time •.. in
response to changing conditions affecting the market for • . • the goods concerned, such as
but not limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods, obsolescence of
seasonal goods, distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith in discontinuance
of business in the goods concerned." 49 Stat. L. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §13(a).
o Principal case at 541.
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however, that the language "such as but not limited to" these specific conditions
indicates that Congress may have intended to leave room for courts to allow
other justifiable discriminations in market situations unforeseen by the drafters
of the statute. 10 It might also be argued that the instant situation is analogous
to the perishable goods "condition"; defendant had to cut his price in order to
sell his bread in this market just as a fruit-grower might have to cut prices to
sell his goods when they are in danger of spoiling. These possible arguments
in favor of the defense are perhaps not as convincing as the poli~y behind them;
if section 2(a) can be construed to allow it, a seller should be permitted the selfhelp remedy of reducing prices in good faith 11 to combat an illegal boycott which
has ousted him from his market, and should not be compelled to seek an injunction or sue for damages under a state or federal anti-trust statute, risking the
concomitant delay of such an action. In permitting sellers to enter and compete
in as many markets as possible, and thus giving consumers a greater number of
sellers to choose from, even where this involves a price discrimination, the court
would be furthering the basic goal of the act.12
William K. Davenport

10 It is not clear just what Congress intended the limits of this proviso to be. Rep.
Utterback, in explaining this section, said only that it could not be used "as a cloak for
price discriminations contrary to the spirit and purpose of this bill." 80 CoNG. REc. 9418
(1936). Defendant's defensive efforts to restore competition in bread to the Santa Rosa
market by breaking his competitor's boycott may well be deemed to come within the spirit
of the statute, in view of §13(b) of the act, which specifically pennits meeting competition
defensively in the context of a competitor's price reduction. See Berger and Goldstein,
"Meeting Competition under the Robinson-Patman Act," 44 Iu.. L. REv. 315 (1949).
11 The proviso does not specify good faith, but that requirement is implicit in the
whole act.
12 Judge Phillips' special concurring opinion favored pennitting the defense on these
facts. "If we deny ... [it]," he said at 542, "the statute, instead of fostering competition
and preventing monopoly, will become an instrument to destroy competition and foster
monopoly."

